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 ARCHIVISTS WITH AN ATTITUDE
 READING TYPOS, READING ARCHIVES
 Steven Mailloux
 rchivists with an Attitude" sounds like a complaint to an old-style historian and
 like a redundancy to a newfangled theorist. A complaint to the historian
 because archivists don't have attitudes, they have methods, and copping an atti-
 tude is inappropriate for any disciplined researcher. A redundancy to the the-
 orist because being an archival researcher is an attitude, perhaps a problematic one
 but nonetheless an acknowledged practice within an intellectual tradition, and tak-
 ing an attitude goes with the territory--it's not an optional stance but a necessary
 condition. However, between the scolding historian and the trivializing theorist,
 straw men both, there are archivists with rhetorical attitudes toward history and the-
 ory and their interrelation. In what follows I will talk about one such "attitude":
 something I call rhetorical hermeneutics. The little history I tell is a rhetorical replay
 of a rather brief and hardly noted confrontation between two archival practices:
 scholarly editing and deconstructive reading. Doing this history allows me to make
 certain theoretical points about archival research and to do so from a rhetorical per-
 spective. That is, I use rhetoric to practice theory by doing history (see Mailloux,
 Reception Histories).
 To be more exact, I'm going to discuss the exciting topic of reading typos as an
 example of archival work. As I present it here, reading typos is a practice within tex-
 tual scholarship, the material and interpretive history of textual documents, which is
 a rather venerable if now somewhat overshadowed tradition of humanistic research
 and pedagogy. I begin with two examples of typo reading and then quickly pass on
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 to some general claims about editing as a paradigm for critical interpretation. In the
 rest of my remarks, I develop only a couple of these claims by discussing in more
 detail the second of my opening examples of reading typos, an example that is part
 of my history of an archival confrontation between editing and deconstruction, tex-
 tual scholarship and poststructuralist theory.
 My first example of typo reading is among the most famous in editing lore: E O.
 Matthiessen's 1941 tour de force in the American Renaissance. In his interpretation of
 White Jacket, Matthiessen praises Melville for his surprising trope, a "soiled fish of the
 sea," and claims that "its unexpected linking of the medium of cleanliness (water)
 with filth (soiled) could only have sprung from an imagination that had apprehended
 the terrors of the deep, of the immaterial deep as well as the physical" (392). As many
 of you know, Matthiessen makes a rather egregious scholarly error here, for he care-
 lessly reads a typo for the truth. Melville almost certainly wrote "coiled fish"; this is
 what appeared in the first edition, and it was some unknown compositor who mis-
 copied this as "soiled fish" for a later reprint of White Jacket. Matthiessen's archival
 negligence in relying on a popular reprint edition has often been used by textual
 scholars as a warning to would-be interpreters who ignore the textual history of the
 version they are using in their critical studies. Note that the Matthiessen passage ends
 with a distinctive binary: "the immaterial" versus "the physical," a figurative opposi-
 tion that is more generally important to archival research, as I will attempt to show.
 My second example of typo reading employs some of the same rhetoric as its
 more famous predecessor. Here I quote from G. Thomas Tanselle's 1990 essay,
 "Textual Criticism and Deconstruction," published in Studies in Bibliography. In a
 footnote to his discussion of Paul de Man's essay "Shelley Disfigured," Tanselle
 points out a possible typo in the sentence "Is the status of a text line the status of a
 statue?" He notes:
 It seems unlikely that de Man meant to say "Is the status of a text line the status of a
 statue?", for a "text line" would seem to mean a unit or building block of a text
 and would therefore not be parallel with "statue," a whole work. The matter must
 remain uncertain, however-as indeed, the constitution of all texts of works is uncer-
 tain. (31 n. 16)
 In this qualified way, Tanselle proposes amending "line" to "like." Later, I will return
 to this proposal and the theoretical argument of which it forms a part, but for now
 I wish to build on the next sentence in Tanselle's footnote: "This typographical error,
 if it is that, illustrates the necessity for deciding on the makeup of the text as a part
 of the act of reading."
 Tanselle's claim nicely fits a general argument I want to make about textual edit-
 ing as the paradigm for critical and historical interpretation. If "deciding on the
 makeup of the text" is an unavoidable act within every reading, then can we not say
 that a kind of editing takes place-by omission or commission-in every textual
 interpretation? It has always been a mistake, I think, for textual scholars-including
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 those who cite the Matthiessen typo reading-to argue merely that responsible edit-
 ing is a necessary preliminary to sound criticism. Rather, it would be better to say that
 editing is criticism and history, both in the sense that editing is an extension of the
 same rhetorical activity of interpretation that results in published arguments estab-
 lishing a text's literary and historical meaning and in the sense that editing provides
 a model for understanding many of the most important aspects of all interpretation,
 the rhetorical establishment of textual meaning. I agree with the view-shared by
 such different editorial theorists as Tanselle, Hershel Parker, Jerome McGann, and
 D. C. Greetham-that editing involves interpretation and not just some mechanical
 process of scientific reconstruction. Indeed, editing is perhaps the best example of
 interpretive practice we have. It explicitly demonstrates several characteristics of the
 interpretive process: (1) its materiality; (2) its embeddedness in traditions of theory
 and practice; (3) its institutional and cultural locations; and (4) its involvement in
 rhetorical politics constituted by arguments over ideologies, professional and other.
 I cannot develop such observations in detail here, but let me make just a few
 explanatory comments. Whether based on replicating a communally published arti-
 fact or on reconstructing the author's final intentions, the concrete text produced in
 editing exemplifies the materiality of all interpretation. To interpret is to translate
 materially one text into another. Such acceptable and approximating translation is
 the exact description of the editing process (see Mailloux, Interpretive Conventions).
 This process always takes place within a tradition represented materially by the
 archival evidence being used to establish the latest editor's text. This editor's activ-
 ity is embedded in an interpretive history, which includes the textual history of the
 work, and he or she carries out the act of editing within this history while located
 within the specific disciplinary context of editing procedures, beliefs about author-
 ship, assumptions about discursive practices, views of publishing, and so on (see Ros-
 marin; Fish; Mailloux, Rhetorical Power). And, finally, the interpretive act of editing
 is unavoidably situated not only within the rhetorical politics of debates about, say,
 a writer's biography or stylistic development, but also within larger ideological con-
 troversies involving race relations, class hierarchies, and gender differences (on the
 rhetorical politics of reception, see Machor; Cain). Editing as archival work
 instances the more general political claim made by Derrida in his recent Archive
 Fever, and I will presumptuously allow his deferral to stand in for my own. He writes:
 Of course, the question of a politics of the archive is our permanent orientation
 here.... This question will never be determined as one political question among
 others. It runs through the whole of the field and in truth determines politics from
 top to bottom as respublica. There is no political power without control of the archive,
 if not of memory. Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential
 criterion: the participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution, and its
 interpretation. (4 n. 1)
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 Now, let me try to develop a couple of my points about editing and archives by
 returning to the typo pointed out by Tanselle. You will remember that Tanselle pro-
 poses correcting "line" to "like" in de Man's sentence, changing it to: "Is the status
 of a text like the status of a statue?" Tanselle follows the amended sentence with the
 remark: "If [de Man] had pursued this question, he might have extricated himself
 from his confusion, for he would have recognized that the medium of literature,
 unlike that of sculpture, is not tangible and that no tangible rendering of a piece of
 verbal communication can be the work itself" (9). Here Tanselle is elaborating on
 the central opposition used in his critique of deconstruction, the opposition between
 "text" and "work," which is in part dependent on a more basic distinction between
 "material" and "immaterial." Tanselle argues that a literary work is immaterial while
 a work of sculpture is material and further that texts (arrangements of words) in
 material documents are the instructions for constituting immaterial works. He crit-
 icizes de Man and the other contributors to the famous 1979 collection Deconstruc-
 tion and Criticism for not respecting these distinctions, and in this particular passage
 he criticizes de Man for failing to pursue a question about poems and statues that
 might have clarified the distinction between immaterial works and material texts.
 Let's look a little more closely at Tanselle's rhetoric, beginning with his antithe-
 sis of text and work. Tanselle's central claim seems to be that the text of any docu-
 ment is not the work itself. The text simply gives instructions for each reader to
 reconstruct the ideal entity in his or her mind that was, for example, intended by the
 author. Thus, for Tanselle, the text of any particular verbal work does not necessar-
 ily exist as such in any single documentary text. There are weak and strong versions
 of this claim. The weak version is that every text of a document must be read by a
 reader to be understood, and the experience of this reading is different from the text
 itself or more exactly from the experience of simply perceiving a document ready to
 be read more thoroughly as a text. The weak version of Tanselle's text/work thesis
 is simply the useful reminder that there are different temporal moments in the read-
 ing process, e.g., perceiving a document, reading its text, establishing its meaning as
 a work, and so forth.
 I note in passing that the definition of text and work assumed in this weak
 version of Tanselle's claim almost exactly reverses several semiological and post-
 structuralist uses of the terms. That is, whereas here text=material object and
 work=immaterial interpretation, some critical theorists claim that work is the mate-
 rial and text the interpretation. In 1971, for example, Roland Barthes wrote in
 "From Work to Text": "the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in lan-
 guage" (157). Twenty years later, Peter Shillingsburg established a similar distinc-
 tion when he noted that Barthes's term "work" corresponded to his own term
 "Material Text" and Barthes's "text" to his "Reception Text," the latter being "con-
 ceptualized by the reader in the act of reading" (56-57 n. 31; 81; see also Mowitt).
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 Nevertheless, despite this history of contrary usage, Tanselle's redefinition of terms
 does not vitiate the weak version of his argument.
 But the strong version of Tanselle's thesis is another kettle of soiled fish alto-
 gether. It claims that there is an immaterial ontological existence to a work that tran-
 scends its representation in any material object. For Tanselle the work somehow
 exists in an ideal realm independent of its textual manifestation in a published or
 unpublished archival document. Moreover, Tanselle goes on to suggest that schol-
 ars cannot be certain they have reached this ideal realm of works in the way that,
 apparently, they can be certain about the material realm of documents. I find this
 textual platonism difficult to fathom. The commonsense view that different mater-
 ial texts do seem to represent contrasting versions of the same work can be acknowl-
 edged without resorting to an ideal realm of the immaterial Work. For example, one
 might agree with Shillingsburg when he claims that "The term Work and the title
 Moby-Dick do not refer to a thing, an object, but rather to a class of objects." He adds
 that "a Work is in important ways both plural and fragmented" (47-48). Or one
 could go even further in rejecting Tanselle's idealism and agree with Jerome
 McGann, who has said that "far from representing an 'alien' condition for messages,
 it seems to me that 'the physical' (whether oral or written) is their only condition"
 (qtd. in Greetham 9 n. 14).
 Be that as it may, Tanselle attempts to support his material-text/ideal-work dis-
 tinction by a related one: the difference between verbal works, like literature and
 criticism, and physical works, like painting and statues. Unlike verbal works, statues
 are material entities in which material texts and immaterial works occupy the same
 space, according to Tanselle (Rationale 21-33). I realize that this difference sounds
 right at first hearing, but it is just as problematic as the text/work distinction. All we
 have to do is start noting examples of etchings or bronze statues produced in multi-
 ple versions. But even if we talk about single paintings or statues, differences in time
 and place make for differences in works, that is, differences in interpretations and
 experiences of these artifacts. I see no qualitative difference between a manuscript
 or book existing in one copy and a statue existing in one copy. All have to be inter-
 preted and experienced by readers/observers. "Is the status of a text like the status
 of a statue?" Yes, sometimes it is.
 Which brings me back to reading the de Man typo. In his commentary on Tan-
 selle's essay, D. C. Greetham argues for the reading "text line" over "text like." Or
 rather, he rereads Tanselle's reading as "humorous" and then carries on in the same
 vein. He writes that Tanselle's footnote on the emendation of "like" for "line" is
 both salutary, and in its irony, very funny, a play with the text reminiscent of the elab-
 orate textuality of Nabokov's Pale Fire. And entering further into the spirit of this
 editorial play on the text in the deconstructive essay, one could perhaps suggest
 that, according to the classical doctrine of lectio difficilior probior est ("the more dif-
 ficult reading is the more moral"), the "text line" reading, because of its seeming
 opacity (but not complete implausibility) is more likely to be authorial than composi-
 torial. (12-13)
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 Let me use this pseudo-controversy over reading a typo to conclude these
 remarks. "Is the status of a text [line or like] the status of a statue?" I have already
 employed de Man's question to punctuate my questioning of the usefulness of the
 work/text and the verbal-text/material-statue distinctions in theory. But what about
 in practice? Is Tanselle right in claiming that texts of verbal works are finally inde-
 terminate because one cannot be as certain about them as texts of statues? Is
 Tanselle's decision to amend the de Manian text any less determinate than placing a
 statue in a museum and calling it "the work"? He seems to claim as much when he
 says that the correctness of his proposed emendation of "line" to "like" "must remain
 uncertain, however-as, indeed, the constitution of all texts of works is uncertain"
 (31 n. 16).
 I would suggest a different conclusion: "Certainty" is relative to rhetorical con-
 text. That is, certainty about the correctness of Tanselle's proposal depends on the
 argument made for the emendation proposed, the disciplinary protocols holding in
 the community in which the argument happens, and a host of other rhetorical fac-
 tors. Accordingly, I would make the following argument in support of Tanselle's pro-
 posed emendation and against Greetham's playful defense of the first published
 version.
 De Man was on sabbatical from Yale in 1978 when a staff member of his depart-
 ment typed the manuscript of "Shelley Disfigured." This typescript was sent to an
 editor at Seabury Press in New York for inclusion in the volume Deconstruction and
 Criticism, which was published in 1979. The typescript contains corrections in de
 Man's own hand, and the typescript version of the problematic sentence reads "like"
 instead of the first published edition's "line." When "Shelley Disfigured" was then
 reprinted in de Man's posthumously published Rhetoric of Romanticism, the sentence
 again reads "like," even though the printer's copy for the essay was the publisher's
 version in Deconstruction and Criticism. What happened? De Man died in December
 1983, and proof sheets of the essays were sent to Andrzej Warminski and two other
 colleagues in March 1984. They used the original typescript to correct the proofs of
 "Shelley Disfigured" and changed the page proofs' "line" back to the original type-
 script's "like." Case closed. At least for the moment. Playfully or not, I claim that this
 historical evidence, including an archival typescript that is as material as any statue,
 helps me to settle the dispute between Tanselle and Greetham and settle it in as
 determinate a way as any setting up of a statue in the Chicago Museum of Contem-
 porary Art. You see, it's all in the rhetoric, whether theory or history, texts or typos.
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